The article addresses specifics of trade secret protection under international investment law. As a particular example, it analyzes protection of pharmaceutical regulatory data against the background of the growing public policy campaign for broader access to clinical trial data and the recent unprecedented practice of the European Medicines Agency of disclosing clinical dossiers submitted for drug marketing approval. Given the significant role of foreign direct investment in the global pharmaceutical industry and substantial, exponentially increasing costs incurred by drug originator companies in conducting clinical trials, the prospect of investor-state dispute over data disclosure does not appear purely hypothetical. The question is whether investor-state arbitration is an apt instrument to protect originators' data against disclosure by drug regulatory authorities. The analysis suggests that the application of standards of international investment protection depends on the specifics of information at issue, its value, and functions in investors' commercial operations. With regard to pharmaceutical test data, it is argued that the prospects of investor-state arbitration are rather unfavorable for the investor, when data is disclosed to support policy objectives in public healthcare and medical innovation.
228 2016] The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law 230 of two types of IP rights-trademarks 6 and patents 7 -have been tested in investor-state arbitration demonstrating the complexity of issues that stretch beyond economic and industry matters.
This paper addresses protection of another category of IP-trade secrets-in the context of pharmaceutical FDI and international investment agreements. The enforcement of trade secret protection has been emphasized by the U.S. in the framework of the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations. In August 2013, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce released a report calling for "enhanced legal protections for trade secrets, including criminalization of willful misappropriation and unauthorized disclosure of trade secrets [to be] elevated on the TPP agenda." 8 The inclusion of the specific obligation with regard to trade secret protection into the investment treaty does not only mean raising the level of the enforcement standard under the national IP law (and, consequently, granting the same level of protection to all WTO Member states due to the national treatment obligation). Protection of IP within an investment bears another important implication; it allows the investor to challenge domestic regulations of a host state that might affect IP-based assets, including confidential business and commercial information, under investor-state arbitration. 9 This article analyses the specifics of protection of clinical data, as a part of pharmaceutical FDI, in the context of the evolving international campaign for greater public disclosure of clinical trial reports submitted for regulatory review. Most recently, the idea of data sharing has been promoted by initiatives such as the 2015 policy of the European Medicines Agency ("EMA"), 10 
THE US CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, THE CASE FOR ENHANCED PROTECTION OF TRADE SECRETS IN THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT 5 (2013)
. 9 See the Office of the United States Trade Representative, Summary of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, available at https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/pressreleases/2015/october/summary-trans-pacific-partnership (last visited Nov. 27, 2015) (stating that the agreement "provides for neutral and transparent international arbitration of investment disputes, with strong safeguards to prevent abusive and frivolous claims and ensure the right of governments to regulate in the public interest, including on health, safety, and environmental protection. The procedural safeguards include: transparent arbitral proceedings, amicus curiae submissions, non-disputing Party submissions; expedited review of frivolous claims and possible award of attorneys' fees; review procedure for an interim award; binding joint interpretations by TPP Parties; time limits on bringing a claim; and rules to prevent a claimant pursuing the same claim in parallel proceedings."). 10 The 12 In broad terms, benefits of clinical data sharing are associated with healthcare improvement and scientific progress: access to clinical dossiers can support various research-related activities, improve efficiency of drug R&D, contribute to greater transparency and accountability of drug authorities, and reduce the risk of publication bias in reporting trial results. 13 Among policy initiatives, 14 the EMA is the first drug regulatory authority to start to disclose clinical reports. 15 As of January 2015, access to clinical dossiers submitted for regulatory review can be provided upon marketing approval of a corresponding drug without the authorization of and remuneration to data originators under the condition that the data is used for scientific, non-commercial research purposes and, explicitly, not for generic drug approval. 16 From the scientific perspective, clinical data presents a unique source of pharmacological knowledge generated during clinical tests about the newly established effects of a drug on the human body. From the business perspective, clinical trials are the most investment-intensive and time-consuming stage of drug R&D. From the regulatory perspective, the submission of clinical trial results that prove efficiency, quality, and safety are requirements enforced by national drug authorities before a drug can be released on the market. From the legal perspective, there is much uncertainty regarding the legal status and substantive rights in various types of data that are comprised in clinical dossiers. Not surprisingly, public consultations preceding implementation of the 2015 EMA disclosure policy featured a heated debate between public interest groups, the scientific community and the research-based biopharmaceutical industry. 17 The U.S. Chamber of Commerce followed EMA's initiative with a study alleging that the EMA's new policy starkly contrasted with existing international practices. 18 The legal basis for the blanket clinical data disclosure is far from clear. Pharmaceutical regulatory data can be protected against disclosure under trade secrets, unfair competition, sui generis regime of data exclusivity, as well as 12 Nov. 10, 2015) . 13 See infra notes 127-136. 14 For an overview of international calls for clinical trial data sharing, see, e.g., PC Gøtzsche, Why We Need Easy Access to All Data from All Clinical Trials and How to Accomplish It, TRIALS, 12:249, at 9-11 (2011). 15 While the EMA earlier policy provided for the "reactive", or request-based access, the 2015 initiative implements the "pro-active" access to clinical reports on-screen as well as in downloadable and searchable formats. See the EMA, supra note 10, ¶ ¶ 4.1, 4.2.1. 16 Id. Annex 1, ¶ 3, Annex 2, ¶ 3. 17 For an overview of the submissions, see the EMA, 19 The Court of Justice of the European Union has recently considered two cases in which pharmaceutical companies-AbbVie and InterMuneobjected to the EMA's decisions to grant access to their clinical data upon request by a third party. 20 Protection of data confidentiality was claimed on the basis of Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and Article 339 of the Treaty of the Foundation of the European Union. Interim injunctions against the EMA's disclosure granted by the General Court of the European Union were, later on, overturned by the European Court's Vice-President and referred back to the General Court to examine the possibility of partial access to the clinical study reports if applicants could establish "with a sufficient degree of probability" the likelihood of "serious and irreparable damage" by third parties' access to some of the contents. 21 The issue of data disclosure is particularly relevant in the context of pharmaceutical FDI. In many cases, the originator and holder of clinical data would be a pharmaceutical multinational company submitting reports on clinical studies for regulatory review on behalf of a local subsidiary. In a more generalized scenarioabstracting from the particular example of pharmaceutical test data-similar investment protection claims can arise when business-related information is submitted for regulatory clearance procedures, and such data is subsequently disclosed by a local authority on public interest grounds. 22 In a broader perspective, issues analysed here pertain to the conflict between private interests in data confidentiality and public interests in access to information; ultimately raising the question of reconciling the two when the state exercises its right to regulate in matters of utmost public interest. 19 It is assumed that, in most jurisdictions, the submission of test data for a regulatory review for the purpose of marketing approval would not qualify as public disclosure, neither involve the transfer of originators' rights in data. 20 (reporting a similar initiative announced by the European Food Safety Authority to make public the data submitted for food safety evaluation and highlighting industry concerns that "the opennesswhich will extend to detailed industry reports-could threaten trade secrets"). What Secrets Investors Should Not Tell States Against this background, this paper analyses the prospects of a hypothetical dispute over the disclosure of clinical data by a drug regulatory authority in the context of investor-state arbitration. 23 In particular, it addresses the questions: Does clinical data qualify for protection as a foreign investment? What standards of protection under international investment law can the investor invoke, and what are the specifics of their application in a particular case of disclosure of clinical dossiers? How would public and private interests stack up, and how can the balancing of interests be approached? The analysis is structured as follows. Part II considers whether clinical data qualifies as the subject matter of protection under an international investment agreement ("IIA"). Part III analyzes how the standards of investment protection apply in a dispute over the regulatory disclosure of clinical dossiers and focuses on the standards of expropriation (drawing an analogy with compulsory licensing for patents) and fair and equitable treatment (reflecting on the notion of "legitimate expectations"). Part IV concludes.
II. CLINICAL DATA AS THE SUBJECT MATTER OF PROTECTION UNDER INVESTMENT LAW
A claim for investment protection shall be subject to the tribunal's ratione materiae jurisdiction if the claimant made an investment in the host state: Do dossiers submitted for drug marketing approval qualify as protected subject matter under international investment law?
A. The Economic Characterization of Clinical Data as Foreign Investment
In the economic sense, foreign investment can be defined as a "commitment of resources to the economy of the host state . . . entailing the assumption of risk in expectation of a commercial return." 24 Although there is no "legally binding 23 One may wonder whether the investor-state arbitration is an apt instrument for the investor to protect regulatory data against disclosure. In the first place, the investor would probably seek to obtain injunctive relief as a remedy rather than the ex post disclosure compensation. Once the data are released into public domain, the consequences can be irreversible: the data originator cannot control or prohibit the subsequent use of third parties of the data disclosed by public authorities. Although investor-state tribunals usually grant relief in the form of monetary damages, the availability of injunctive relief is not excluded. 26 Having admitted the lack of "real discussion" of the criteria for characterization of an investment in earlier cases, 27 the tribunal in Salini summarized that "the doctrine generally considers that investment infers: contributions, a certain duration of performance of the contract and a participation in the risks of the transaction." 28 As an additional condition, contribution to the economic development of a host State was mentioned in relation to the Preamble of the ICSID Convention. 29 Furthermore, the tribunal held that, although "in reality, these various elements may be interdependent," they "should be assessed globally." 30 In that context, 'globally' could be interpreted as considered altogether, in their overall effect.
It is somewhat curious that, in subsequent decisions, tribunals referred to the abovementioned elements as the 'Salini test.' 31 The broad wording gives a general idea rather than stipulate a legal standard as a set of specific qualifying factors. These criteria can be seen as neither absolute nor binding. 32 Under such a broad approach, clinical dossiers can be notionally recognized as part of a foreign investment, especially since many IIAs explicitly incorporate intangible assets into the definition of investment. 33 However, further questions arise: Does it matter that the R&D activity-i.e., clinical trials and drug development-took place in a country other than the host state and not necessarily for the purpose of obtaining marketing authorization in that particular host state? With respect to drugs, for which marketing approval is sought in a foreign jurisdiction, does it matter where such drugs were originally produced? 25 34 in which the Canadian pharmaceutical company contested the U.S. FDA's decisions that had rejected its applications for marketing authorisation for two generic drugs. The claimant alleged that it had "made substantial 'investments,' including, but not limited to, the expenditure of millions of dollars each year in preparing ANDAs 35 for filing in the United States, and formulating, developing, and manufacturing approved generic pharmaceutical products for sale in the United States and throughout the world;" this qualified as investment in the meaning of Article 1139 of the NAFTA Agreement. 36 The U.S. argued that Apotex's activities in the territory of the United States with respect to sales of the two generic products in casu were "those of an exporter, not an investor," while the sales were made by the U.S.-based distributors. 37 The argument was upheld by the UNCITRAL tribunal which affirmed that the claimant's activities in relation to drug regulatory approval in the country of exportation did not qualify as "an 'investment' in and of itself, within the meaning and scope of NAFTA Article 1139." 38 Consequently, the case was dismissed due to the tribunal's lack of jurisdiction.
According to one opinion, Apotex's "critical omission" was "its failure to develop a claim that its U.S. affiliate [Apotex Corp.] was independently a NAFTA investment." 39 However, had Apotex submitted the claim on behalf of its U.S.-based affiliate, would it, in principle, change the nature of Apotex's business in the U.Si.e., sales through the affiliated agent and distributor? 40 At the end, the tribunal was "unpersuaded" that such affiliate independently qualified as investment of "an interest in an enterprise" for the purposes of NAFTA Art 1139(e). 41 It is common that pharmaceutical multi-national corporations ("MNCs") conduct the majority of clinical trials in one country and use essentially the same dataset to obtain marketing authorization in multiple jurisdictions. 42 40 Apotex (Award), supra note 38, ¶ ¶ 235-6. 41 Apotex (Award), supra note 38, ¶ 238, footnote 108 (noting that "there was no evidence that Apotex Corp was an "investment" of Apotex, or that Apotex had an interest in it, such as to satisfy NAFTA Chapter Eleven"). 42 There are ethical arguments against risk exposure of humans and animals if clinical trials had to be repeated for the same drug in each jurisdiction, where marketing authorization is sought. Some jurisdictions may require one to conduct a part of clinical trials on the local population.
Yet, patents are commonly recognized as a category of assets within the investment definition under IIAs. 43 The Apotex decision points out an important distinction between a foreign investment as the business activity, and investment as costs incurred to create a business asset. This suggests that, even though a certain asset can explicitly be mentioned under an IIA, its qualification for protection as an investment should be analysed in conjunction with the economic activity of a foreign entity. If the business activity of the clinical data-holder is recognized as a foreign investment, costs related to conducting clinical trials can be seen as related expenditures (akin to the notion of the "pre-investment" that enables business operations in a host state). However, the interests arising in relation to the investment as resources committed to a host state's economy, rather than the recovery of the costs of creating a particular asset, would be subject to protection. 44 
The issue of contribution to the economic development of a host state
Contribution to the economic development of a host country was mentioned in the Salini decision as an additional criterion. Indeed, the developmental dimension of international investment rulemaking has been addressed in terms of the prospective agenda rather than the actual state of affairs. 45 In more pragmatic 43 other international agreements that relate to intellectual property, particularly where these conventions might require standards of treatment which differ from the MAI or where these conventions provide for dispute settlement mechanisms"). 44 See Douglas, supra note 24, at 187, 257 (arguing that "the notion of a 'pre-investment' is meaningless" while the decisive factors for the investment definition are (i) whether the expenditures in the host state related to the acquisition of a property right that has the characteristics of, at least, one of the categories of an investment as defined by the relevant investment agreement, and (ii) the economic characteristics of an investment have materialized for the purpose of committing resources to the host state's economy, whereby the claimant bears a risk related to commercial returns). 45 See, e.g., Omar E. García-Bolívar, Defining an ICSID Investment: Why Economic Development Should be the Core Element (2012) available at https://www.iisd.org/itn/2012/04/13/defining-an-icsidinvestment-why-economic-development-should-be-the-core-element/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2016) (highlighting the lack of the explicit textual reference between the treatment of investment and the goals to promote economic development in international investment agreements); see also The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Development Implications of International Investment Agreements, IIA Monitor No., UNCTAD/WEB/ITE/IIA/2007/2, at 7 (2007) (arguing that, "to the extent that the development dimension is addressed in international investment rulemaking, it is done in an indirect manner and in a primarily defensive mode, in order to shield contracting parties permanently or temporarily from assuming their full responsibilities under the agreement"); The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Investment Promotion Provisions in International Investment Agreements (2008) (suggesting that "[c]onsideration could be given to developing guidelines on corporate economic development contributions to specifically address economic development concerns"). See generally Stephan W. Schill, International Investment Law as terms, one can see foreign investment as "essentially about the acquisition of a cross-border claim to income in the hope of getting a return in the future." 46 At the same time, the developmental aspect of foreign investment cannot be completely ignored. Its importance can be seen in at least two aspects: as forming the interpretative context for international investment dispute resolution, 47 and as pertaining to the balance of commitments. 48 The latter can be considered as an inherent quid pro quo in relation to the host state's motivation to ensure a favourable environment supporting investors' businesses and protecting investments.
In the Philip Morris v. Uruguay dispute over tobacco plain packaging legislation, Uruguay objected to the tribunal jurisdiction for the reason, among others, that the alleged investment did not satisfy the contribution-to-development criterion of the Salini test. It was argued that the claimant's activities imposed "huge costs" on Uruguay 49 and "the 'net contributions' to the economic development made by the Claimants' interests and activities in Uruguay has been overwhelmingly negative." 50 That argument was dismissed by the tribunal. First of all, it did not consider the Salini criteria as "jurisdictional requirements to the effect that the absence of one or the other of these elements would imply a lack of jurisdiction." 51 Furthermore, it held that the notion of "investment" under Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention was intentionally unspecified to cover "a wide range of economic operations confirming the broad scope of its application." 52 However, the scope could not be stretched limitlessly and its "outer limits" would not encompass "a single commercial transaction, such as the mere delivery of goods against payment of the price." 53 Suffice it to say, the developmental aspect has not been perceived by tribunals as a mandatory legal criterion for the purpose of investment definition and protection. Even if it were so, such requirement would not be problematic for IP-based assets. Contribution to socio-economic and technological development has Oct. 22, 2015) . 47 The ICSID Convention, first Preamble, available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/partA-preamble.htm ("Considering the need for international cooperation for economic development, and the role of private international investment therein . . . ."). 48 These two aspects are interrelated. For instance, as highlighted in the Malicorp v. Egypt award, "the notion of investment must be understood from the perspective of the objectives sought by the Agreement and the ICSID Convention. They are there to 'promote' investments, that is to say, to create the conditions that will encourage foreign nationals to make contributions and provide services in the host country, but also, and to that end, to 'protect' the fruits of such contributions and services." Malicorp v. Egypt, Award, ¶ 110 (February 7, 2011).
49 Philip Morris v. Uruguay, supra note 32, ¶ 177. 50 Id., ¶ 182 (alleging that "[b]ased on the Claimants' own inflated estimate, their combined contributions total around US $ 29 million per year, more than offset just by the direct health care costs of US $ 30 million"). 51 Id., ¶ 206. 52 Id., ¶ 200. 53 Id., ¶ 203.
been viewed as the main justification for establishing the international system for IP protection allowing WTO member states to benefit from greater FDI and technology transfer. 54 This discussion does not intend to contribute to the debate regarding the extent to which this proposition holds true in general, or insofar as trade secrets are concerned. It is worth mentioning, however, that the relationship between trade secrets and innovation is not formalized as, for instance, in the case of patent protection that is granted vis-à-vis public disclosure and dissemination of technical knowledge. The sole value of trade secrets subsists in confidentiality; their contents and value can vary substantially. There is no "trade secret office" that, akin to a patent office, would assess whether a certain piece of information meets the merits of protection justified by its contribution to innovation. If a trade secret covers technical know-how, its transfer to a local subsidiary under a confidentiality agreement can be viewed as a contribution to technological development. 55 As far as clinical data are concerned, one can argue that local partners can learn from the scientific data, methodology and know-how contained in clinical dossiers. In this sense, clinical trial data can be viewed as contributing to development of the technical capacity of local subsidiaries. 56
B. The legal characterization of clinical data as an investment
The legal characterization of a foreign investment-tangibles as well as intangibles-is contingent upon securing property rights as recognized under the domestic law of the host state. 57 Protection of trade secrets is perhaps the least harmonized area of IP law. Jurisdictions can vary substantially in defining the legal 54 Studies, in general, find a positive relation between the growth of FDI and the strength of IP protection. For an overview of literature on this expansive subject. 55 In Salini, for example, the tribunal held that the investors contributed to the economic development of the Moroccan State by providing the know-how in relation to the contracted work (Salini, supra note 27, ¶ 57). On the importance of partnerships with pharmaceutical MNCs as a source of local technological capacity building, see, e.g., The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, LOCAL PRODUCTION OF PHARMACEUTICALS AND RELATED TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2011) (reporting on the case studies of the pharmaceutical FDI in developing countries and highlighting the role of the FDI in establishing, improving and expanding the local pharmaceutical production capacity, as well as the role of the related technology transfer for technological upgrading of the local subsidiaries). 56 The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, LOCAL PRODUCTION OF PHARMACEUTICALS AND RELATED TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2011) at 243-4 (reporting on the influenza vaccine project implemented by the WHO in Thailand and stating that "technical know-how and access to regulatory dossiers may present more significant challenges than patent issues." Within the framework of the project, clinical dossiers, alongside with research and production related materials were comprised within "one technology package [that could] enable technology transfer in a cost-effective and timely manner.").
57 Douglas, supra note 24, at 52. What Secrets Investors Should Not Tell States status, substantive rights, type and scope of protection in confidential information. 58 As far as undisclosed information is concerned, the reference point under international IP law is Article 39 of the TRIPS Agreement 59 that, in contrast to other IP categories, does not obligate WTO member states to grant protection in the form of exclusive rights. Instead, the provision presents a peculiar combination of unfair competition, trade secret and sui generis regimes of protection. To claim investment protection of data in a host state, the law of that state should recognize a right in rem in clinical data. 60 The contents of a clinical dataset comprise a broad range of miscellaneous data: some might qualify as commercial information, some as technological know-how, while some might qualify as scientific findings. 61 Substantive rights in clinical data might vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction; their recognition and scope, and entitlement to ownership are less certain than in the case of patents, which are secured upon the formal acquisition of rights (again, there is no "office of trade secrets" that would assess "secrecy claims" and issue a certificate of entitlement to the exclusive right). While a patent application 62 can confer on the applicant a property-type right to exclude third parties' unauthorized use of the claimed subject matter, in the case of an application for drug marketing approval, the administrative decision does not confer an entitlement in property right in data. Hence, neither application for marketing authorization, nor the marketing authorization itself possesses the legal characterisation of investment. Likewise, in the Apotex case, the tribunal did not consider whether there were property rights in clinical data as such. However, as far as an application for marketing authorization was concerned, it was "not persuaded that an ANDA [Abbreviated New Drug Application] must be characterized as 'property' for the purposes of NAFTA Article Apotex may have a right under U.S. law to have its disclosures to the FDA kept confidential, but there is no basis for this to transform the inherent nature of the ANDA itself, from an application for permission to export goods into the United States, into some form of investment within the scope of NAFTA Article 1139(g). 64 This statement suggests that, for the purpose of assessing whether an individual asset qualifies as an investment, the nature of the business activity would prevail over the legal status of the asset at issue. An investment agreement can explicitly incorporate intellectual property into the investment definition. 65 However, in the event of a dispute, a particular IP asset should be analysed in relation to the claimant's economic activity in a host state. In Philip Morris v Uruguay, for instance, the tribunal did not analyse trademark rights affected by the contested regulatory measure in isolation from other assets specified by the claimant as its investment, but awarded jurisdiction based on the overall assessment of the claimant's activities in Uruguay. 66 For the purpose of further analysis, we assume that the claimant would not be engaged merely in exporting activity but would carry out drug development and manufacturing in a country that adopts data disclosure policy after the investment was made. In this sense, clinical dossiers would form a part of a foreign investment, as they would enable an enterprise to obtain marketing authorization and perform business operations in a host state. 67 
III. THE APPLICABLE STANDARD OF PROTECTION
There are substantive differences in the nature and scope of protection between international investment and IP law. Currently, 161 WTO member states are bound by the TRIPS Agreement to implement minimum standards of IP protection. In many cases, multilateral free trade agreements ("FTAs") stipulate higher protection 
The rest of this section analyses how the standards of expropriation and fair and equitable treatment (FET) can apply to investment claims against regulatory disclosure of clinical data. Other investment protection standards that deal with the arbitrary treatment of investors are not considered here, as it is assumed that, in principle, data disclosure policy is not directed at foreign companies or a particular investor but applies to all holders of drug marketing authorization. 70 
A. The assessment under the Expropriation Standard
As mentioned, the legal status of and substantive rights in clinical data can vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. However, irrespective of how legal title in clinical data is determined, data disclosure by a drug authority, in principle, does not involve the transfer of ownership to the government or a third party, nor does it create a The statistical analysis accounts for the increase in RTAs with provisions related to pharmaceuticals including patent linkage and clinical data protection which "would be even more apparent if the agreements establishing the EEC, EFTA and the Andean Community were excluded from the count as initially they did not contain significant pharmarelated provisions as such but rather established the legal frameworks within which such provisions were subsequently introduced."). For a comprehensive coverage of the adoption of TRIPS-plus standards via bilateral and regional free trade agreements, see generally DAVID VIVAS EUGUL, REGIONAL AND 69 See TRIPS Agreement art. 43-47, 50 (stipulating obligations to provide for remedies against third party's unauthorized acts). 70 For instance, in the case of the EMA, any applicant's data submitted for the EMA's review can be subject to disclosure upon the grant of the EU marketing authorization, irrespective of the country of domicile of the applicant.
[15:228 2016] The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law 242 limitation on the use or withdrawal of marketing authorization issued on the basis of the submitted data. Hence, there is no direct expropriation. What appears less certain is whether the disclosure of data for experimental use interferes with the investor's business activity to an extent that it can amount to investment (indirect) expropriation.
In the Apotex case, the pharmaceutical company argued that the U.S. breached its obligation under NAFTA Article 1110 by interfering with and expropriating Apotex's property rights in applications for generic drug approval, in particular, by (i) "delaying Apotex's eligibility for final approval and timely entry into the generic pravastatin market" and, thus, "substantially depriving Apotex of the benefits of its investments in its generic pravastatin ANDA," and (ii) by "unlawfully redistributing the financial benefits of Apotex's investment" to its competitors. 71 It challenged administrative and judicial decisions regarding Apotex's ANDAs issued based on the U.S. rules and procedures for generic marketing approval. Damages were claimed in the amount of $8,000,000. 72 In response, the U.S. argued that Apotex's claims under NAFTA Article 1110 were "without merit" as, first, the applications for generic approval did not constitute an "investment" under NAFTA Article 1139, and second, Apotex did not provide support "for its assertion that any of the various administrative and judicial decisions taken by U.S. federal courts and FDA were tantamount to an expropriation." 73 The question of whether the effect of the enforcement of the drug approval regulation on Apotex's ability to enter the market indeed amounted to expropriation was not decided by the tribunal, as all claims were subsequently dismissed due to the tribunal's lack of jurisdiction ratione materiae and ratione temporis. 74 To support the expropriation claim, an investor would need to prove the impairing effect of a contested regulatory measure on the investment. When raising the expropriation argument, Apotex could relate the U.S. FDA's decision not to grant marketing authorization with the commercialization of its products. In the case of clinical data, the causal relationship between the regulatory measure enabling data disclosure for non-commercial, public interest purposes and the impairment to commercial viability of investment appears less evident. Does clinical data disclosure hinder the investor's ability to utilize the data as an asset, or deprive the investor from benefits accruing from its own use of data?
The tribunal would need to determine whether the contested policy measure affects the value of data to an extent that it causes a loss to the investor's business or impairs enterprise operations. In the tobacco packaging dispute, Philip Morris alleged that the effect of Australia's plain packaging legislation amounted to expropriation as it deprives the company of "the value of its shares, which is heavily dependent upon the ability to use the intellectual property on or in relation to tobacco products," 75 and that the interference of Uruguay's regulation with the exercise of trademark rights resulted "in a substantial reduction of the value" of the investor's What Secrets Investors Should Not Tell States enterprise and deprived it "of substantial revenue and profit." 76 In the case of clinical data disclosure, it might be hard for an investor to defend an analogous argument. The imposed limitation on the commercial use of trademark rights can objectively interfere with the profitability of an enterprise. 77 Clinical data does not have a comparable commercial use-the primary function of clinical dossiers is to support an application for drug marketing approval. Thereafter, clinical reports are not used in the course of drug production, in a way that such use would add value to the product and contribute to a firm's profits.
One can draw an analogy between the "forced" disclosure of regulatory data and compulsory licensing of patents. The issuance of a compulsory license can interfere with the patent holder's interests and exercise of rights, while the validity and ownership of patent rights remain intact. Regulatory disclosure involves limitation of the investor's discretion over clinical data (the EMA, for instance, grants access without authorization of or compensation to the data originator). The main difference between the two is that, in the case of compulsory licensing of patents, the detrimental impact on enterprise profitability by the limitation of exclusive rights is more evident than in the case of data disclosure for non-commercial use. Unlike a patented technology, clinical data does not have a "productive use" in a sense that the exclusion of competitors from such use in drug manufacturing would contribute to the data holder's market power. 78 Within the public interest rationale for clinical data disclosure, one can distinguish between the purpose of protecting public health and that of promoting follow-on drug R&D. 79 The former refers to situations when an authorised drug can raise safety concerns. 80 That would be perhaps a prima facie case when a regulatory 78 Such effect is associated with the referential use of clinical dossiers for the purpose of generic drug approval. 79 For instance, the EMA policy differentiates between the purpose of "public scrutiny" and that of the "application of new knowledge in future research." See the EMA, supra note10, at 3-4. 80 Such concerns would normally be addressed under pharmacovigilance (post-marketing surveillance) regulation that would provide for access to clinical dossiers for independent investigators for the secondary analysis. The reports also provide information about some of the hurdles the applicants had to overcome, which could reduce the development process for a medicinal product by two to three years. 82 Thus, the difference between a compulsory license for patents and regulatory data disclosure can be seen in that, under a compulsory license, the patented subject matter would be used to manufacture and commercialize a generic product, while the disclosed clinical data are supposed to contribute to new drug development. 83 Such use is unlikely to cause an immediate impact on profits from sales of the drug for which the dataset was initially generated to support marketing authorization. The outcomes of 'experimental' use by third parties appear remote and probabilistic at the . 83 See the European Medicines Association Policy, supra note 10, ¶ 4.1 (stipulating that access to data is granted "to enable . . . application of new knowledge in future research"). What Secrets Investors Should Not Tell States point of data disclosure, and can depend on a particular research project and the period when data are utilized, e.g., at an early stage of research when an original hypothesis is formulated, or during the more mature, pre-market product development. It may take years until the results of the follow-on R&D activity can be commercialized.
In this regard, experimental use contrasts the so-called referential use of clinical data for the purpose of generic approval. 84 In case of the latter, the launch of a generic drug can offset the investor's share in the relevant market. The submission of clinical data is a regulatory requirement that enables market access; the grant of marketing authorization does not come with monopoly-type legal protection. High costs of data generation can serve as a de facto market barrier and potentially eliminate competition in a specific drug market. However, data disclosure for experimental purposes would not remove this barrier for potential competitors. Nor would it interfere with the commercialization of the investor's drug.
The investor can argue that the disclosure of clinical data can confer a competitive advantage on competitors and speed up development and commercialization of new drugs. 85 However, third parties' benefits resulting from the experimental use of data might not necessarily be offset by the data originator's loss. First, the use of data in drug R&D is non-rivalrous; clinical data can be used in parallel R&D activities, i.e., third parties' use would not impede the originator's R&D. Second, experimental use may or may not result in a new product. Even if it does, the new drug may or may not compete with the originator's drug in the future. Overall, probabilistic and remote prospects of the outcomes of research use of data do not provide a strong basis for a claim that the disclosure would impair the economic viability of the investor's business activity to an extent that it can amount to investment expropriation.
B. The assessment under the FET Standard
The implementation of the 2015 EMA disclosure policy took over two years and was preceded by public consultations; its conditions apply vis-à-vis all holders of marketing authorizations granted by the EMA. Executed in a transparent and consistent way, the disclosure measure lies outside of the core area of the FET principle that is associated with protection against arbitrariness and the denial of justice. However, recent developments in tribunal decisions brought some novelties 84 That is, when a drug authority evaluates a generic application on the basis of the clinical trial reports submitted by the originator company for marketing approval of its product. To obtain marketing authorization, a generic company needs to prove bioequivalence with the originator drug, but it is exempted from conducting full-scale clinical trials to demonstrate drug efficacy and safety. 85 The argument that access to clinical dossiers can provide a springboard in the developmental work for a competing product, for instance, was raised by AbbVie that objected to the disclosure of its clinical data by the EMA. See Case C-389/13 P(R), European Medicines Agency v. AbbVie, ¶ 18 (arguing that "clinical study reports describe the manner in which the AbbVie companies planned and implemented the clinical trials necessary in order to obtain the MA [marketing authorization] for that medicinal product for the indication of Crohn's disease and therefore provide a very specific road map for a company wishing to develop a medicinal product in the very competitive field of tumour necrosis factor (TNF) antagonists") (emphasis added).
in interpretation of the FET standard that can potentially broaden the scope of its application. Of particular interest is the notion of "legitimate expectations."
In the aforementioned tobacco and trademark disputes, the claimants invoked the notion of legitimate expectations alleging violation of the FET standard. 86 It remains to be seen how this notion will be interpreted by tribunals when assessing IP-related investment claims. 87 In general, legitimate expectations can hardly be considered as a well-established legal doctrine adding a substantively new dimension to the content of the FET standard; nor has it been consistently applied in arbitral decisions. 88 Some tribunals recognize that investor's legitimate expectations can be a relevant factor within the FET standard. 89 However, the meaning of "expectations" was mainly associated with protection against regulatory measures enforced by the host states in an arbitrary way. 90 The liability threshold was set considerably highto constitute a violation, a state would need to "transform and alter the legal and business environment under which the investment was decided and made," 91 or "completely dismantle the very legal framework constructed to attract investors." 92 In some cases, tribunals interpreted the notion of expectations as being confined to expectations to earn returns on investment. For instance, in El Paso it was held that "a balance should be established between the legitimate expectation of the foreign investor to make a fair return on its investment and the right of the host State to 94 In general, tribunals have been rather reluctant to recognize investors' expectations that the regulatory framework can remain "frozen" after an IIA is signed. 95 The notion of expectations is inherently subjective and the legal standard of protection cannot possibly accommodate investors' individual perceptions of how their investments should be treated. 96 Several qualifying factors have been advanced by the tribunals to set boundaries to the scope of protection against regulatory changes that may contradict investors' expectations. In particular, legitimate expectations shall be analysed objectively, in light of the circumstances that could have induced such expectations, 97 while most weight should be given to precise and explicit assurances and representations provided to the investor by the host state. 98 Specific provisions within a regulatory framework should be of such material importance that the investor would need to rely on them when making investment decision. from the latest awards which have examined this topic, one can see that there has been a gradual limitation of the more far-reaching dicta found in the first generation cases seen above"). 96 Saluka, supra note 89, ¶ 304 (holding that "the scope of the Treaty's protection of foreign investment against unfair and inequitable treatment cannot exclusively be determined by foreign investors' subjective motivations and considerations").
97 El Paso v. Argentina, supra note 93, ¶ 356. "FET can be linked to foreign investors' legitimate and reasonable expectations, [however] these expectations, as well as their violation, have to be examined objectively", and that "legitimate expectations cannot be solely the subjective expectations of the investor, but have to correspond to the objective expectations than can be deduced from the circumstances. . See Potesta, supra note 88, at 98-113 (identifying "patterns of governmental conduct which tribunals have found to be susceptible of generating legitimate expectations deemed worthy of protection" and distinguishing between contractual assurances, informal assurances and general regulatory framework as sources of investor's expectations). 99 See, e.g., Joseph Charles Lemire v. Ukraine, Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability, ¶ 264 (Jan. 14, 2010) (stating that "[t]he FET standard is thus closely tied to the notion of legitimate expectations-actions or omissions by Ukraine are contrary to the FET standard if they frustrate legitimate and reasonable expectations on which the investor relied at the time when he made the investment").
To support a claim for protection under the FET principle, instead of the nebulous notion of legitimate expectations, an investor should invoke specific provisions under the respective IIA that could be interpreted as giving rise to the obligation to treat regulatory data in a particular way. 100 In the absence of explicit commitments or assurances to maintain the confidentiality of data upon regulatory review, the investor may try to identify provisions under the sectorial regulations applicable to clinical data, or legal norms generally applicable to confidential commercial information and trade secrets at the time of making an investment that would guarantee confidentiality protection. 101 Administrative law might contain provisions stipulating that the data submitted for regulatory review shall not be disclosed to third parties. Furthermore, the investor can resort to the customary treatment of clinical reports: dossiers submitted for the purpose of drug marketing approval can be held by a drug authority upon the decision to grant or deny marketing authorization, but normally they are not disclosed to third parties. 102
International IP protection standards for pharmaceutical test data as a source of "legitimate expectations"
In trademark and patent related disputes, claimants invoke obligations under the TRIPS Agreement as a source of their expectations for investment protection. 103 Article 39(3) of the TRIPS Agreement ("TRIPS 39(3)") applies to pharmaceutical test 100 (last visited Jan. 13, 2016) (mentioning among the arguments against the EMA proactive disclosure of clinical trial reports that "Bilateral agreements normally protect strategic partnerships in the development of know-how in research and development of the product and the underpinning technology. Such agreements usually contain a confidentiality clause upon the contracting parties that is actionable in case of breach. It is generally expected that the confidential nature of such information (particularly that concerning the manufacturing and control of the product and detailed pre-clinical testing data and clinical strategic plan) is respected by the competent authorities during the course of the regulatory review."). 101 The determination of the legal status and substantive rights in data comprised in clinical reports can be complex and jurisdiction specific. In the U.S., for instance, the regulatory framework . Furthermore, the General Court concluded that "there is no case-law that would make it possible to give a ready answer to the questions of confidentiality that fall to be decided in the present case by the future judgment on the substance." Id., ¶ 62. 102 In this regard, the EMA 2015 disclosure policy sets a precedent, when a drug authority grants access to clinical dossiers submitted for the regulatory review to third parties. 103 Members, when requiring, as a condition of approving the marketing of pharmaceutical or of agricultural chemical products which utilize new chemical entities, the submission of undisclosed test or other data, the origination of which involves a considerable effort, shall protect such data against unfair commercial use. In addition, members shall protect such data against disclosure, except where necessary to protect the public, or unless steps are taken to ensure that the data are protected against unfair commercial use.
Ironically, the provision on trade secrets appears a mystery and poses an interpretative challenge regarding the minimum international requirement for test data protection. 104 Protection obligation is conditioned on the equivocal notion of the "unfair commercial use" that, up-to-date, has not been interpreted in WTO jurisprudence. 105 The agreement's travaux préparatoires suggest that, originally, protection was directed at the referential use of clinical data for the purpose of expedited generic drug approval. 106 This, however, does not necessarily mean that was the final result achieved during the TRIPS negotiations. Even if one assumes that "unfair commercial use" implies referential use for generic approval, the debateable issue is whether the TRIPS Agreement stipulates protection in the form What Secrets Investors Should Not Tell States taken to ensure that the data are protected against unfair commercial use." 110 These two conditions are not cumulative and differ in the grounds for disclosure. Under the first condition, data can be disclosed if, for instance, there are health risk concerns over the safety of the marketed drug and access is needed for independent investigators to conduct secondary analysis of the results. The second condition is, again, contingent on the notion of "unfair commercial use." If one assumes that it refers to use for generic approval, data disclosure should be allowed upon the expiration of the term of protection, either in data exclusivity or liability form. As pointed out before, the EMA disclosure policy explicitly precludes the use of data for the purpose of obtaining marketing authorization and only allows access for public scrutiny (that would be within the first exception under TRIPS 39(3)), or for the purpose of follow-on research. 111 It appears uncertain whether the so-called experimental or scientific use of test data for R&D purposes comes under the notion "unfair commercial use." 112 The EMA equates research use with use for non-commercial purposes. 113 An issue might be taken, however, with regard to the 'non-commercial' use of clinical data, as any activity in the course of drug R&D can be viewed as potentially directed at the subsequent commercialisation of a new drug. At the same time, the possible impact of third parties' access to data for R&D purposes on investor's profits, in terms of the prospective development and introduction of a new product, is hypothetical and can hardly be ascertained and evaluated at the time when access to clinical reports is granted.
Given much ambiguity regarding the requirement under TRIPS 39(3), compliance with international standard for test data protection can hardly form a strong basis for the investor's reasonable and legitimate expectations in situations when data are disclosed for public interest reasons. 114 Data disclosure policy can be an unwelcome surprise for pharmaceutical companies. However, the claim that the 110 TRIPS Agreement, Article 39(3). 111 See the EMA Policy, supra note 10, ¶ 4.1 and Annex 1, ¶ 3 (stipulating that "[w]hen using the Clinical Reports, the User shall . . . not use [reports] . . . for any other purpose than general information and non-commercial purposes, including non-commercial research purposes"; and "the User may not use the Clinical Reports to support an application to obtain a marketing authorisation and any extensions or variations thereof for a product anywhere in the world"). 112 On the proportionality and necessity test with regard to public interest exception provided under Article 39(3) of the TRIPS Agreement, investor relied on the confidentiality protection of clinical dossiers when making investment decisions appears disproportionate in relation to other factors of investment amortization such as market size and economic conditions of a recipient state. 115 Regulatory measures can vary significantly in terms of the magnitude of a change, underlying policy objectives and the gravity of the impact on investment. Data disclosure for non-commercial purposes bears, by far, less impact on the investor's profits if compared with measures such as drug price regulation or policies promoting generic competition.
The proportionality test and balance of interests
Some tribunals, when assessing "legitimate expectations" claims, resorted to the proportionality test and balance of interests. In El Paso, for instance, the tribunal held that the notion of legitimate expectations itself is "the result of a balancing of interests and rights, and that it varies according to the context" 116 and should be assessed "with due regard to the rights of the State." 117 In Oostergetel, the tribunal agreed that "stability of the legal and business environment does not equate immutability of the legal framework and that legitimate expectations must be measured through a balancing test taking account of specific circumstances." 118 Questions arise: In what sense is balancing a measure of the "legitimacy of expectations"? What is the relevance of correlating the legitimacy of investor's ex ante expectations for protection with an ex post regulatory act?
In Saluka, the tribunal hinted at the unenforceability of obligations under investment treaties that are "inappropriate and unrealistic" if interpreted "too literally." 119 The tribunal also emphasized that "the scope of the Treaty's protection of foreign investment against unfair and inequitable treatment cannot exclusively be determined by foreign investors' subjective motivations and expectations", and "in order . . . to be protected, [expectations] must rise to the level of legitimacy and reasonableness in light of the circumstances." 120 While qualifiers such as "inappropriate and unrealistic" might be of little guidance for the assessment, this view suggests the application of a tentative rule of thumb to determine whether expectations for protection extend beyond the scope of the state's discretion to regulate in the areas of public concerns. As the tribunal in S.D. Myers v. Canada held, the determination of a breach of the investment protection obligation "must be made in light of the high measure of deference that international law generally What Secrets Investors Should Not Tell States extends to the right of domestic authorities to regulate matters within their own borders." 121 In other words, investors should not expect too much.
Balancing can be applied in the arbitral analysis for different reasons. For instance, in the El Paso award, the tribunal, on the one hand, held that "the determination of a breach of the FET obligation . . . requires a weighing of the Claimant's legitimate and reasonable expectations on the one hand and the Respondent's legitimate regulatory interests on the other," 122 in other words, to determine whether the protection obligation was breached by a policy measure. On the other hand, it noted that "[i]n order to determine whether frustration of the foreign investor's expectations was justified and reasonable, the host State's legitimate right subsequently to regulate domestic matters in the public interest must be taken into consideration as well," 123 i.e., using balancing at the defense stage. 124 The proportionality test asks the following question: Is the loss caused to investment proportionate to the benefits of the regulatory measure? In other words, were the means proportionate to the objectives? In this sense, the idea of proportionality is akin to the concept of the necessity defense under customary international law. In Philip Morris v . the Government of Australia, the tobacco company claimed that "the benefits of the legislation (if any) are entirely disproportionate to the harm it will cause to PM Asia's investment; accordingly, the legislation is not fair and equitable in any sense." 125 The question is how to find comparable values to measure costs and benefits and weigh up the harm to private interests of a single investor and potential benefits to the public? The two appear to be in different "weight categories."
This article does not intend to analyse how the concept of proportionality should be implied in balancing the rights of investors and public interests. 126 For the purpose of this discussion, several possible arguments can be pointed out that can be raised in response to investor's protection claim, either when determining whether protection obligation is breached by data disclosure, or whether the breach is justified.
From the policymaking perspective, access to clinical data can support a range of objectives. In the area of public health, it can improve drug safety and quality, contribute to the transparency in decision-making of drug authorities, and reduce the risk of publication bias in reporting trial results. 127 Clinical trials are subject to that end, to 'protect' the fruits of such contributions." 138 In this view, when access to clinical data is allowed for non-commercial public policy reasons and does not interfere with the commercialization of investor's drugs, access policy should not be viewed as violating investment protection obligations.
IV. THE CONCLUSION
To answer the question stated in the title, investors might be wary to disclose to state authorities, in the course of regulatory procedures, information that has potentially high public interest.
Pharmaceutical companies can resort to international investment law to challenge domestic policies enabling disclosure of test data. However, in light of the specific characteristics of clinical data analysed above, the prospects of investor-state arbitration appear rather weak for the investor. Most challenging for the claimant would be to prove actual or potential financial loss caused by third parties' 'non-commercial' use of data. This does not preclude investors from claiming protection under national trade secret law, though the remedies might be less attractive than those that could be obtained under IIAs.
In more abstract terms, a dispute over pharmaceutical test data disclosure explicates a conflict between private interests in confidentiality protection and public interests in access to information.
Investment law-designed to regulate international economic relationships-is perhaps not meant to answer the normative question of under what circumstances certain type of information should be subject to disclosure. Trade secrets can cover information of highly diverse contents and economic value. In cases where confidentiality of data plays a crucial role for appropriating returns on investment, the investor might have a more convincing argument to challenge access-to-information public policies. Yet, it may still not outweigh the public interest justification.
